



HISTORY

ROUTE 2

HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL

PAPER 1 – PEACEMAKING, PEACEKEEPING – INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1918–36

Tuesday 11 May 2010 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the Abyssinian Crisis (1935–36).

SOURCE A *Extract from the **Covenant of the League of Nations**, 1919.*

Article 16 – Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance [cutting off] of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all exchange between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal business between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such cases to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

SOURCE B *Statement about a meeting between British prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, and a delegation of the League of Nations on 13 December 1935, marked “strictly confidential”. www.nationalarchives.gov.uk*

[The prime minister] assured us that he held faithfully to all his pledges with regard to the League and suggested that the interview should be both frank and confidential. The prime minister said that the League’s policy is still the policy of the [British] government and we were all in agreement in desiring that the policy should be effective. Translating desire into action, however, raised extremely difficult questions. He then explained the great gravity of the European situation, including the danger that Mussolini might make a “mad dog” [irrational] attack on the British fleet. Though the results of such an attack must in the long run be the defeat of Italy, the war might last some time and produce both losses and diplomatic complications of a serious kind. Meantime we were bound to consider whether we could rely on effective support from any other member of the League. No member except Great Britain had made any preparations for meeting an attack. As to France, the whole French nation had a horror of war.

SOURCE C

*“The Road from Rome”, cartoon appearing in **The New York Times** depicting Mussolini during the Abyssinian Crisis, 6 October 1935.*



“The Road from Rome”

SOURCE D

*Extract from **Africa in War and Peace** by Eric S Packham, 2004. The author, who was in Africa at the time of the Abyssinian Crisis, served in the British Army in the Gold Coast (Ghana) during the Second World War.*

We all felt it was an ignominious [humiliating] ending to the high hopes which had been placed on the League of Nations when the Assembly refused to take the one decisive measure which would have halted the invasion – the prohibition of the exports of oil to Italy, without which Mussolini could not have supplied his invading forces ... In 1935 Laval’s main foreign policy aim was to maintain an alliance with Italy, so it was more important to have Mussolini as an ally against Hitler than to defend Haile Selassie against him. Also Hoare and Laval apparently believed that Mussolini might go to war against Britain if Britain should impose an oil sanction against Italy or cut Italy’s communications with Abyssinia ... In 1935 Britain was the leading power in Europe and should have accepted responsibility for taking the lead and dealing effectively with the Abyssinian situation. The other League members were not backward in imposing sanctions against Italy, but unfortunately Britain failed to give an effective lead until it was too late.

SOURCE E

Extract from a speech by Haile Selassie to the League of Nations, June 1936.

I, Haile Selassie Emperor of Abyssinia am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people and the assistance promised to it eight months ago when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in violation of international treaties ... What real assistance was given to Ethiopia by the fifty-two nations who had declared the Rome Government guilty of a breach of the Covenant and had undertaken to prevent the triumph of the aggressor? ... I noted with grief, but without surprise that three powers considered their undertakings under the Covenant as absolutely of no value. ... What, then, in practice, is the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant and of collective security? ... It is collective security: it is the very existence of the League of Nations. It is the value of promises made to small states that their integrity and independence be respected and ensured ... it is the principle of the equality of states. ... In a word, it is international morality that is at stake.

1. (a) What, according to Source A, was the significance of Article 16 of the *Covenant of the League of Nations*? [3 marks]
(b) What is the message conveyed by Source C? [2 marks]

 2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources B and D about British policy during the Abyssinian Crisis. [6 marks]

 3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source D and Source E for historians studying the Abyssinian Crisis. [6 marks]

 4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, assess the reasons why the League of Nations' policy of collective security was difficult to apply in the Abyssinian Crisis. [8 marks]
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